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Abstract 
This study aims to explain why countries maintain security cooperation with a partner even though 
they are in the middle of severe tensions. This is experienced by the Republic of Korea (ROK), 
which preferred to maintain its security cooperation with Japan under the General Security of 
Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA). This research utilizes the concept of abandonment 
fears to explain South Korea's behavior in reversing its self-declared withdrawal from GSOMIA 
in 2019. By conducting a deductive-qualitative research approach, this research shows that South 
Korea was in a position of abandonment fears—fears of being ignored by Japan—magnified by 
the uncertainty of US commitment. For now, South Korea considers Japan as the most likely 
partner choice in the region. Thus, Seoul decided to maintain the partnership with Japan within 
the GSOMIA framework and compromise its grievances with the latter. 
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Introduction 
States yearn for stable regional security 
since it could significantly affect their security 
as well. Regional stability is influenced by the 
interaction of states within the region and the 
influence of external powers. Apart from the 
relationships between actors, the patterns of the 
dominant behavior of entities and institutions 
are also essential in shaping regional orders: 
the power and behavior of regional powers, 
conflict, cooperation, regional integration, and 
interference from external powers (Ponizilova, 
2017, p. 182). States aim to survive in the 
unknown international political arena (Suseto, 
Othman, & Razalli, 2019). One way to achieve 
that goal is by joining the security cooperation 
or alliance in the region. This was also what 
encouraged South Korea and Japan to sign 
General Security of Military Information 
Agreement (GSOMIA).1
Each region has its characteristics that 
shape the way states interact with each other. 
So does East Asia, whose interaction is colored 
by competition and antagonism. South Korea 
and Japan are geographically located in East 
Asia with a tendency to have cold, if not 
hostile relations. What is unique about their 
interaction is that despite their shared ally (the 
United States) and adversaries (China, Russia, 
and North Korea), all these similarities cannot 
1 General Security of Military Information Agreement 
(GSOMIA) is a commonly used term regarding 
intelligence and sensitive military information sharing 
between countries. It was signed by South Korea and 
Japan on 23rd of November 2016 under the framework 
of Agreement on the Protection of Classified Military 
Information. 
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make South Korea and Japan closer allies. This 
relates to the fact that South Korea was under 
Japanese rule from 1910 to 1945 as stipulated 
in the Japan-Korea Treaty 1910. During that 
time, South Korea experienced Japan's colonial 
brutality and, until now, this historical memory 
has overshadowed the relationship between the 
two countries (Korostelina, 2017) and has often 
been a trigger for tensions.
South Korea and Japan have committed 
to GSOMIA since 2016, with the support from 
the United States. This security cooperation is 
renewed every year unless one country declares 
its withdrawal. GSOMIA is strategically 
essential for South Korea because it enables 
South Korea and Japan to directly share 
intelligent information about missile threats 
from North Korea. South Korea-Japan security 
cooperation is considered a quasi-alliance since 
they are not directly connected if there is no 
backup from the United States, their common 
ally.
The year 2018-2019 was such a tremendous 
period for South Korea-Japan relations. Some 
media and Northeast Asian security affairs 
observers and pundits even considered this 
as the worst period of South Korea - Japan 
relations since the normalization pact in 1965 
(M. C. Lee, 2019). The tension was stimulated 
by the reemergence of the Women Comfort 
issue in South Korea. During the Asia Pacific 
War (1937-45), Japan forcibly employed at least 
200,000 women from various Japanese colonies 
in Asia to serve Japanese soldiers in brothels 
called comfort stations (Min, 2003, p. 938; 
Hayashi, 2008, p. 127). South Korean women 
were also forced to work without payment for 
the Mitsubishi Aircraft Plant in Nagoya in 1944 
(bbc.com.2008). The court ordered the Japanese 
company, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, to pay 
compensation to the forced laborers for 80-150 
million Won (Japan Press Weekly, 2018). Aside 
from that, the Japanese government was also 
required to apologize to the comfort women 
survivors and their families. The Japanese 
government rejected these orders by claiming 
that those matters had already been settled 
through the agreement on Japan-South Korea 
relations' normalization in 1965.
The tension between South Korea and 
Japan then escalated and impacted various 
aspects of cooperation that have previously 
been established. On the economic aspect, 
South Korea and Japan have excluded each 
other from the white list of export destination 
countries. Japan has also restricted the export 
of high-tech spare parts, which are vital for 
South Korea. These frictions keep deteriorating 
and as a countermeasure, South Korea 
officially announced that it would not renew 
its membership in GSOMIA three months 
before the cooperation period ended that year. 
However, on November 22, 2019, just a few 
hours before the end of the GSOMIA validity 
period, South Korea made a surprising decision 
by aborting its previously self-announced 
withdrawal from GSOMIA. South Korea 
declared that it would stay in GSOMIA for an 
undefined time.
This particular behavior of South Korea 
is interesting to further scrutinize since the 
decision to stay in GSOMIA came up in the 
middle of South Korea and Japan’s increasingly 
heated relations. This study explores the 
factors that can influence changes in states' 
behavior reflected in their actions in security 
cooperation. Based on such a background, 
this article asks why South Korea reversed 
its previous self-announced withdrawal from 
GSOMIA amidst its deteriorating relationship 
with Japan in 2019. 
State behavior in security cooperation is 
mainly analyzed by scholars in international 
relations using the alliance theory. Snyder 
defines an alliance as a formal association of 
several countries regarding the use (or lack 
thereof) of military force, which is intended 
for security or protecting member states, 
against certain states, either explicitly or not 
(G. H. Snyder, 1990, p. 104). Snyder briefly 
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called alliances as a tool for security against 
adversaries. A more specific definition is put 
forward by Niou and Ordeshook (1994), which 
states that an alliance is a group of countries 
that are bound together by a collective security 
strategy respecting each other but not with 
countries that are outside its membership (Niou 
& Ordeshook, 1994, p. 167).
Along with developing contemporary 
international relations and issues, the alliance 
theory cannot explain state behavior in security 
cooperation that occurs indirectly, especially 
with third-party involvement as a patron state. 
Therefore, a new concept emerged: quasi-alliance. 
Cha (2000, p. 262) defines “quasi-alliance” as 
the relationship between two countries that are 
not formally allied but have a third party as a 
patron – typically a great power—as a familiar 
ally. This consists of two levels of analysis; 
the inner and outer core. The inner core is the 
bilateral aspect between the two quasi-allied 
countries, and the outer core is the multilateral 
aspect that involves great power as a common 
ally. A very different definition is conveyed 
by Degang Sun (2009), who states that quasi-
alliances are formed from permanent or ad hoc 
informal security cooperation arrangements 
based on collective defense pacts that are not 
formal, but are instead agreements between 
two or more countries or international regimes 
(Sun, 2009, p. 68). As an instrument of analysis, 
this article applies Cha's (2000) conceptual 
premise on quasi-alliance since it describes an 
actual condition of South Korea and Japan's 
security partnership with the United States' 
influence as their patron.
The condition of abandonment and 
entrapment fears will emerge along with 
the dynamic relations within quasi-alliance 
states. According to Cha (2000), when a state is 
afraid of being abandoned (abandonment fears) 
it will show a more significant commitment 
to cooperate, hoping that the partner will do 
the same. Conversely, a state that is feeling 
trapped (entrapment fears) will display a faded 
commitment to cooperate with other parties. 
Cha also illustrates that a country with a high 
abandonment fears level can be reflected from 
various steps it takes to overcome these fears, 
namely (1) building better internal capabilities, 
(2) looking for new alliances or strengthening 
alternative alliances, (3) strengthening their 
commitment to the alliance to expect their 
partners to do the same, (4) calming the enemy, 
or (5) acting as if they are leaving the alliance 
(bluffing abandonment) to get more significant 
support from the alliance partner (Cha, 2000, 
p. 266).
These are what South Korea did. It 
previously announced the withdrawal from 
GSOMIA before aborting it and renewing its 
commitment to the GSOMIA. Furthermore, 
South Korea also showed efforts to build its 
internal capacities, especially in regard to 
security. This is particularly evident with 
the defense and military budget that kept 
increasing, from 26 Trillion Won in 2008 to 
more than 43 trillion Won in 2018 (South Korea 
Ministry of National Defense, 2018).
F o u r  c o n d i t i o n s  c o u l d  l e a d  t o 
abandonment fears, as explained by Cha 
(2000). First is the perception of external threats. 
The more intense the threat's perception, the 
greater the abandonment fears toward its 
alliance partners will be. Alliances are very 
commonly seen as a response to threats (Walt, 
1985). Perceptions of threats are the results 
(outcomes) of activities (which can be done) 
by Party A that are perceived or imagined by 
Party B (Baldwin, 1971, p. 72). In other words, 
perceptions are subjective. When a threat is 
not perceived, there can be no mobilization of 
resources to carry out a defense even though 
there is objective evidence. Conversely, threats 
can be perceived, and defense measures are 
taken, even when the opponent does not have 
malicious intentions (Cohen, 1978, p. 93). 
The second factor that contributes to 
abandonment fears is the choice of allies. The 
lack of options for having alternative partners 
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will push the state to maintain its relations 
with its existing one. Third, the internal balancing 
capability. This feature is vital since the rupture 
of the alliance could lead to escalated conflict. 
Internal balancing capability can be assessed 
from the state's relative power materials 
(Treverton & Jones, 2005). Fourth, the precedent of 
a partner's appeasement policies toward the threat. 
Finally, the relations and commitment of common 
ally or patron. This research will analyze these 
five factors to assess South Korea’s aborted 
withdrawal from GSOMIA in late 2019.
Enemy of Yesterday, Insincere Alliance of 
Today: South Korea - Japan Security Relations
The delicate dynamics of bilateral relations 
involving South Korea and Japan present three 
common features. First, the South Korean 
people's perception is essential in influencing 
political decisions made by the country's elites 
regarding cooperation with Japan. Especially 
after World War II, several distinctive factors 
have shaped and reshaped such perception, 
including identity conflict (Nam, 2017), a 
dualism-perception gap of South Korea's 
geopolitical interest in relations with Japan 
(Sohn, 2008), collective memory regarding 
“past problem” of South Korea-Japan relations 
(Eun-Mi, 2010), and liberal public discourse 
(Phillips, Lee, & Yi, 2019). However, the dual 
perception is reflected in the identity conflict 
regarding military cooperation with Japan, 
as well as the gap of elite perceptions about 
geopolitical dynamics of the region; the existing 
liberal public discourse still believes that South 
Korea and Japan have a realistic opportunity 
to improve relations along with the emergence 
of spirit to understand the history empirically.
In regards to the second features, we 
consider that the decision-making process of 
South Korea's foreign policy toward Japan has 
frequently—if not always—become the site for 
symbolic politics (J. Y. Kim, 2014).  Symbolic 
politics—a mass-led process in South Korea 
and an elitist process in Japan—have become 
such a manifestation of the diplomatic conflict 
resulting from feuds between the conservative 
elite groups in both countries (J. Y. Kim, 2014). 
As a result, quite often the two countries 
put themselves in the position of rhetorical 
entrapment (Park, 2017). For example, the way 
the South Korean and Japanese conservative 
elite groups used symbolic politics before 
and during the Iraq war had led each country 
trapped in the awkward opposite position, 
and regardless they are unified in security 
cooperation.
The third feature of South Korea and 
Japan relationships emphasizes the significance 
of the United States. Despite existing problems 
in their alliance (A. Kim, 2020), which even 
amount to a certain degree of distrust (M. Kim, 
Parker, & Cho, 2006), the United States will 
remain the patron for South Korea and Japan's 
security cooperation. The cooperation itself will 
keep moving due to mutual understanding and 
the factor of North Korea as a common threat. 
The North Korean threat will keep dominating 
South Korea's current and future national 
security calculations, and Seoul's alliance with 
Washington will be a major component of 
South Korea's national security requirements 
(Bong, 2016, p. 40).
Those three standard features tell us that 
South Korea and Japan relations' dynamics 
challenge the conventional assumption of the 
balance of threat, which champions that the 
same perception of threats would make two 
countries become solid allies (Walt, 1985). 
The relationship of South Korea and Japan 
has had significant ups and downs and even 
tends to be conflictual, regardless of their 
relative congruence threat perception and 
United States' influence as their patron. This 
unique pattern of South Korea – Japan relations 
makes it an exciting yet challenging case to be 
examined further.
Furthermore, the common features 
mentioned above have brought up three 
consequences, namely: (1) the ups and downs 
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of South Korea-Japan relations as well as the 
causes of improvement and deterioration 
of relations between the two countries; (2) 
perception of South Korean people toward 
Japan and vice versa; and (3) the role of the 
United States as a common ally for the existence 
of South Korea and Japan security cooperation. 
Nevertheless, there has been no specific 
discussion about South Korean behavior in its 
quasi-alliance with Japan, especially when it 
comes to assessing South Korea's decision to 
abort its withdrawal from GSOMIA in the face 
of its complicated bilateral relations with Japan.
The escalated tension of South Korea-
Japan bilateral relations contrasts with the 
fact that South Korea finally cancelled its 
decision to leave GSOMIA and showed its 
commitment by compromising friction with 
Japan. The case of South Korea-Japan security 
cooperation that is being studied in this article 
deserves further analysis to shed more light on 
various factors that encourage the continuity 
of states' cooperation within a quasi-alliance 
setting. From a larger perspective, this is an 
important subject to discuss since South Korea 
and Japan bilateral relations, particularly in 
the security area, affect their security interest 
and significantly impact the political-security 
stability in the East Asia Region. Had their 
quasi-alliance broken, it might have caused 
significant geopolitical and geostrategic 
changes and it would have potentially put East 
Asia’s political-security constellation in limbo.
Method
This article analyzes South Korea's 
decision to cancel its withdrawal from security 
cooperation with Japan. Using the quasi-
alliance concept mentioned earlier, it explains 
why Seoul annulled its self-announced 
withdrawal from the General Security of 
Military Agreement (GSOMIA) in 2019 by 
looking at the condition of abandonment and 
entrapment fears faced by the South Korean 
government.
In analyzing the condition of abandonment 
fears, this article applies the qualitative research 
method with a deductive approach. The 
qualitative research method underlines the 
depiction of the context to define the research 
subject's connotation and offers an explanation 
of a case being studied (Bryman, 2004, pp. 
366-367). In this line, the qualitative research 
method in this article would explain the 
condition of abandonment fears within the 
context of South Korean security dynamics, 
which is used as the basis for Seoul to cancel its 
withdrawal from GSOMIA in 2019. Meanwhile, 
the deductive approach implies that this 
article refers to a theoretical framework and 
scrutinizes components as units being studied 
identified from quasi-alliance, namely (1) 
the perception toward external threats; (2) 
the choice of allies; (3) the internal balancing 
capability; (4) partner’s appeasement policies 
toward the threat; and (5) the relations and 
commitment of common ally or patron.
This article uses primary and secondary 
data. Primary data are gathered from the 
South Korean President's public speech 
and government elites that reflect the South 
Korean foreign policy, official documents 
such as defense white paper and other official 
information issued by the South Korean 
government. Secondary data used in this 
research are supporting information needed 
in explaining the background information 
of South Korea-Japan quasi-alliance and its 
character, the US involvement in their relations, 
and Asia Pacific security as a whole. Those 
secondary data are gathered from previous 
studies, scientific journals and reports. The time 
frame of the data assessed is backtracked from 
before South Korea announced its intention 
to leave GSOMIA, when its bilateral relation 
with Japan began to deteriorate around 2017-
2018, until South Korea officially reversed the 
decision in November 2019. We then implement 
the triangulation process to ensure the accuracy 
and validity of the data and prevent bias of 
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perspectives by conducting cross-reference 
checking (Lamont, 2015) following our research 
question.
Results and Discussion
South Korea's decision to stay in GSOMIA 
with Japan after aborting its previous self-
declared withdrawal shows that South Korea 
still needs Japan as a quasi-alliance partner, not 
to say that it is dependent on this cooperation. 
This is confirmed with the fact that South 
Korea even compromised on the ongoing 
friction in its bilateral relations with Japan. 
This particular behavior of South Korea reflects 
the abandonment fears of South Korea or a 
fear of being ignored by Japan. States in the 
position of abandonment fears will show a 
more significant commitment to cooperate in 
the hope that their partners will do the same 
(Cha, 2000, p. 268). 
The South Korean fear of abandonment 
might have rooted in its inner core and outer 
core factors. The first inner core factor is South 
Korea's perception of North Korea's threat 
that remains high. This forces South Korea to 
seek support from allies. Secondly, the limited 
option of alternative partners also raises the 
abandonment fears of South Korea. Next, the 
lack of internal balancing capabilities of South 
Korea toward Japan inevitably leads South 
Korea not to prolong its friction with Japan.
Furthermore, the precedent of Japan's 
appeasement policy to North Korea, which is 
a common threat for South Korea and Japan, 
increases its fears of abandonment. From the 
outer core, the United States' influence as their 
common ally could not be denied. Current 
friction and uncertainty commitment of the 
United States pushes South Korea to maintain 
its relationship with Japan. These various 
factors inevitably lead South Korea to consider 
Japan as the most likely partner choice in 
the region for now, so it decided to maintain 
GSOMIA, and in the end, compromised its 
tensions with Japan.
South Korea’s Threat Perception: Threat from 
the North and Regional Security Dynamics
One factor that prompted South Korea 
to cancel its decision to leave GSOMIA is 
the perception of threat that the country 
had to overcome alone if it left GSOMIA. 
Perception of threat can be assessed from four 
indicators, namely articulation or expression 
reflected by decision-makers against threats, 
the embodiment of supporting elements 
of government, evidence of exploration of 
various alternatives (such as intensive internal 
consultation, seeking external support), efforts 
to overcome threats such as strengthening 
resource mobilization, and taking diplomatic 
steps (Cohen, 1978, p. 95). The perception 
of the threat toward North Korea remains 
high, which is influenced by its continued 
nuclear proliferation activity. When a country 
witnesses another country arming itself, it will 
be considered to destroy its security; a negative 
image is attached to the country (Arif, 2016, p. 
122). This perception was articulated by South 
Korean President Moon Jae In during his 100-
day reign when he said, "I would consider North 
Korea crossing a red line if North Korea launched 
another Transcontinental Ballistic Missile and 
armed it by placing a nuclear warhead on top of the 
missile" (C. Kim & Kim, 2017).
North Korea as a perceived threat is also 
reflected in the Ministry of Defense's regulations 
and policies. Such a threat perception exists 
in South Korea's Defense White Paper by 
detailing the dynamics of South Korea – North 
Korea relations, as well as data of North 
Korea's military strength, including sensitive 
information on its nuclear development (South 
Korea Ministry of National Defense, 2018). 
Furthermore, South Korea makes it clear by 
setting various efforts to overcome this threat, 
including defense diplomacy as trust-building 
and military dialogues to prevent potential 
tensions with North Korea. The South Korean 
Ministry of National Defense stated that since 
the 1990s, there had been 169 official military 
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dialogues arranged between South Korea and 
North Korea, including Defense Ministerial 
talks, General Officer-Level Talks, Military 
working-level talks, and Military High-Level 
Talks. However, there was no significant 
progress in building military trust due to the 
North's remaining threats and provocative 
actions (Ministry of National Defense Republic 
of Korea, 2021). 
South Korea’s perception of threat 
should have decreased by the declaration of 
The Panmunjom for Peace, Prosperity, and 
Reunification of the Korean Peninsula achieved 
in 2018, which was envisioned to enlighten 
the prospect of South Korea improved-
relations with North Korea. Nevertheless, this 
confidence-building measure is hindered by the 
stagnancy of the US-North Korea negotiation 
on denuclearization. Both parties persisted in 
their position: the US demanded North Korea 
demonstrate a significant commitment to 
denuclearization measures before relieving its 
sanctions, while North Korea pushed the US to 
end the sanction first as the prerequisite for its 
denuclearization process. None could expect 
more for the future of this denuclearization 
process so that South Korea’s perception of 
threat remains high.
Another aspect that illustrates South 
Korea's perception of the North Korean threat 
is South Korea's efforts in exploring alternative 
responses to overcome that threat; one of 
them is seeking help from external support 
(alliances). This underlies the establishment 
of GSOMIA as an effort by states that perceive 
North Korea as a threat to seek external 
support by establishing security cooperation 
on sensitive military information sharing.
Furthermore, the perception of threat 
is also affected by the dynamics of states' 
interaction within the region. The year 2018 was 
full of vigilance for South Korea due to various 
political movements and strategic actions of 
surrounding states, such as China and Russia. 
At the time, South Korea considered dynamics 
of the external environment and the East Asian 
region as a growing uncertainty and instability 
as mentioned in the South Korea Defense White 
Paper 2018: 
“In Northeast Asia, the strategic 
competition between the United States 
and China is intensifying, while Japan 
and Russia are competitively building 
their military strength, mainly their 
naval and air forces, to expand their 
influence. Such security situation, 
combined with the denuclearization 
of the Korean Peninsula, is creating 
further uncertainties and volatility in 
the regional security of Northeast Asia.” 
In addition, China—one of the countries 
that supported 2016's UN economic sanctions 
against North Korea's nuclear development—
seemed to improve its relations with North 
Korea in 2018. Beijing showed diplomatic 
support for Pyongyang through various senior 
military official exchange programs and bilateral 
economic cooperation. Likewise, as stated in 
ROK Defense White Paper 2018, North Korea-
Russia relations were also getting warmer by the 
exchanges increased in the commemoration of 70 
years of diplomatic relations between Russia and 
North Korea. In that same year, both countries 
also agreed to hold a Russia-North Korea Summit 
during the Russian Foreign Minister's visit to 
Pyongyang (South Korea Ministry of National 
Defense, 2018).
These political movements and strategic 
dynamics around the East Asia Region, 
especially during 2018-2019, inevitably 
prompted South Korea to rethink its decision 
to leave GSOMIA. The perception of the 
volatile external strategic environment that 
South Korea described in its 2018 Defense 
White Paper had shown its concern over 
strategic moves by North Korea. Around that 
period, North Korea also appeared to be more 
active in making approaches to great powers 
in the region, which unfortunately resulted in 
antagonism toward South Korea.
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South Korea’s Limited Options for Alternative 
Allies 
Allied with the United States, South Korea 
could not ally with any other states that are 
either an enemy or a competitor to the United 
States. This limits alternatives for South Korea 
to seek alliances within the region other than 
Japan. Although South Korea has strengthened 
its military sector by modernizing its military 
technology and developing the national 
military industry (Moon & Lee, 2008), there 
are still dependencies on the United States 
regarding protecting its national security, 
especially in dealing with the North Korean 
threat. Therefore, even if there are some 
frictions in South Korea's relations with the 
United States, the risks are too significant to 
cheat by allying with other states that would 
never be approved by the United States. 
On the other hand, South Korea's relations 
with great powers around the region, such as 
Russia and China, also tend to be antagonistic. 
During most of the Cold War and the years after, 
South Korea and Japan faced the same threats, 
namely China (Sagena & Moorthy, 2012), the 
Soviet Union, and North Korea  (Cha, 2000, 
p. 281). Not only opposing the United States, 
Russia and China are also approached by North 
Korea. This could eventually threaten South 
Korea. Such a limited choice for alternative 
alliances has strengthened Japan's position as 
the most likely potential ally for South Korea, 
at least for now. As such, South Korea deeply 
reconsidered its previous self-announced 
decision to leave GSOMIA.
South Korea’s Lack of Internal Balancing 
Capabilities vis-à-vis Japan 
South Korea needs to bear with more 
significant conflict with Japan had it persisted 
in the previous decision on leaving GSOMIA. 
Therefore, internal balancing capability is an 
essential aspect that South Korea considered 
in formulating its strategic decision. The 
internal balancing capability can be assessed 
by comparing states' relative power indicators, 
including military strength as measured from 
the military budget, economic wealth reflected 
from the gross domestic product (GDP), and 
technological innovation (Treverton & Jones, 
2005, p. ix).
Table 1 above shows that South Korea's 
defense budget and GDP have increased 
every year since 2016. South Korea has also 
developed its domestic military industry to 
reach independence in military supply (Moon 
& Lee, 2008). All the support and incentives 
provided by the government to the domestic 
military industry has been able to make South 
Korea reach the target to fulfill its domestic 
need for the armament; furthermore, South 
Korea is recognized as the third-largest arms 
exporter in the developing world (Chung-in, 
1991, p. 445). However, its military-industrial 
strength is not enough to balance Japan and 
the other great powers around the region, 
which also have questionable intention toward 
South Korea. This unfavorable condition for 
South Korea is exacerbated by the arms race 
tendency in the Asia Pacific. During the 2011-
2015 period, SIPRI recorded the Asia Pacific 
countries as the most prominent weapon 
Table 1: GDP and Military Budget of South Korea 2016 - 2019
unit: KRW (billion)
2016 2017 2018 2019
GDP 1,641,786 1,730,399 1,787,502p 1,857,215e
Military Budget 
(billion dollar) 38,800(34.0$) 40,335(35.1$) 43,158(38.2$) 46,697(42.5$)
Source: Obtained from primary data (Ministry of National Defense Republic of Korea, 2019) 
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importers, about 46% of the total world’s 
arms imports (Oi-hyun, 2016). Hence, Japan 
has issued new defense reform legislation to 
respond to the growing dominance of offensive 
behavior by the neighboring countries in East 
Asia (Alghifari & Letticia, 2016, p. 18). Likewise, 
the World Bank recorded South Korea's GDP in 
2019 is amounting to reach USD 1.647 trillion 
with more than 51.7 million people of the total 
population, which is still lower than Japan 
with a GDP of 5.082 trillion USD and a total 
population of 126.5 million of people (World 
Bank, 2020a). Nevertheless, South Korea's GDP 
shows a relatively increasing trend every year 
compared to Japan, whose growth tends to 
slow down.
The internal balancing capability might 
also come from the excellence in technological 
innovation (Treverton & Jones, 2005, p. 14) In 
this aspect, South Korea is one of the leading 
countries. Unfortunately, South Korea is highly 
dependent on Japan to supply high-tech spare 
parts for Korean industries, especially for the 
defense industry. South Korea's technology-
based defense industry ran into big trouble 
when the Japanese Ministry of Commerce 
announced a temporary ban or suspension 
of export permits for materials vital to the 
South Korean semiconductor industry, such 
as liquid hydrogen fluoride—a chemical used 
to produce chips (The Japan Times, 2019). 
Semiconductors are the main source of income 
for South Korea's Samsung and contributed 
for 21% of its total exports (J. Lee, 2018). Thus, 
deteriorating relations with Japan would be 
very detrimental to the South Korean economy.
Furthermore, it should be noted that 
South Korea is striving to bring success 
to North Korea's current denuclearization 
program. South Korea needs to be meticulous 
in each action taken, including managing 
the source of funding. South Korea always 
bears a high-cost burden due to the conflict 
with North Korea, one of the triggers of the 
unhealthy economy that led to South Korea's 
financial crisis in 1997 (Tanahsaldy, 1998, p. 41). 
International financing is critical for the North 
Korean denuclearization process, considering 
that many North Korean nuclear projects are 
hidden in tunnels so that high costs are needed 
to destroy nuclear facilities and stockpiles 
(Hornung, 2018). Japan is indeed a desired 
potential source of funding for this agenda. 
Thus, leaving the alliance means losing the 
great funding source to support a sustainable 
denuclearization process in North Korea.
Figure 1. 
The trend of GDP of South Korea vs. Japan (1960-2019)
      The GDP Trend of South Korea                            The GDP Trend of Japan
  
Source: World Bank National Account Data (World Bank, 2020a) (World Bank, 2020b)
262
Jurnal Ilmu Sosial dan Ilmu Politik, Volume 24, Issue 3, March 2021
Flirting with the Enemy: Japan's North Korea 
Appeasement Policy 
Abandonment fears will increase when the 
quasi-alliance partner shows a friendly attitude 
(appeasement policy) toward the threat. A state 
will feel abandoned when its partner appeases 
and gets closer to the threat. However, Japan 
considers North Korea a threat, mainly after 
North Korea conducted several nuclear and 
missile tests. Since the Taepondong missile's 
launch in 1998, which passed over northern 
Japan, North Korea has launched several 
missiles at Japan, across Japan and into the 
Japanese exclusive economics zone (Hornung, 
2018). Nevertheless, in March 2019, Japan took 
appeasement action to win North Korea's 
heart to smoothen the negotiation process for 
resolving the kidnapping case that North Korea 
had committed against Japanese citizens in the 
1970-1980s. This is seen when Japan did not 
participate in submitting a proposal to the UN 
Human Rights Council against North Korea 
for the first time. This is contradictory because 
Japan used to be actively formulating motions 
for human rights violations by North Korea, 
and together with the EU submitting them to 
the UN Human Rights Council every year since 
2007 (Hurst, 2019).
In this case, Japan seemed to have its 
priority on getting along with North Korea. 
This appeasement was aimed in the context of 
lobbying North Korea in order to be willing 
to wrap the negotiations to resolve the case of 
the kidnapping of Japanese citizens by North 
Korea. By withdrawing from the annual UN 
resolution on North Korean human rights, 
Tokyo sent a signal to Pyongyang (Hurst, 2019). 
It was not the first time Japan acted kindly 
toward North Korea. There was a considerable 
controversy looking back to the early period of 
South Korea-Japan normalization of relations 
in 1965. Such a controversy erupted when 
Japanese business firms Mitsui and Toho 
Beslon Co. were reported to export $40 million 
worth of plant equipment for manufacturing 
acrylic fiber to North Korea. The controversy 
also occurred when the Japanese government 
decided to allow North Korean technicians 
to inspect the machines in Japan in July 1966 
(Far Eastern Economic Review, 1966, p. 340). 
The South Korean government announced 
that such a move would not only violate the 
newly crafted 1965’s Treaty on Basic Relations 
between Japan and the Republic of Korea 
(widely known as normalization pacts) but 
also helped North Korean war preparations 
for attacking South Korea (Ko, 1972, p. 57). In 
addition, the policy of repatriation of North 
Korean citizens from Japan and recognition 
of educational institutions that are pro-North 
Korean in Japan (Ko, 1972, pp. 56-59) added 
to the long list of Japan appeasement policies 
to North Korea that led to protests from 
South Korea. South Korea views any contact 
between Tokyo and Pyongyang as an act of 
ungratefulness that undermines Seoul's efforts 
to maintain regional stability (Cha, 2000, p. 
271). 
Unreliable Patron: US' Strategic Commitment 
and South Korea – US Relations 
South Korea and the US have become 
close partners in security cooperation since the 
signing of the US-South Korea Mutual Defense 
Treaty in 1953. Since then, the United States 
has become such a "protector" for South Korea, 
especially regarding defense mechanisms 
against the North Korean threats. The US places 
around 28,500 troops in South Korea, which is 
part of the United States "nuclear umbrella" 
program (Manyin, Chanlett-Avery, & Williams, 
2019).
However, 2018-2019 was not the best 
year for South Korea - US bilateral relations. 
At least two issues trigger friction in their 
security partnership, namely the problem 
of different approaches to North Korea's 
denuclearization taken by the US and the 
issue of the contribution of military costs. 
On the one hand, Moon supported Trump's 
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"maximum pressure" campaign toward North 
Korea denuclearization. On the other hand, 
South Korea also maintains its preference for 
embracing North Korea (Manyin et al., 2019). 
Moon fears that a coercive approach to North 
Korea will lead to potential retaliation from 
North Korea that could threaten the Korean 
Peninsula's stability.
Regarding cost-sharing of military 
cooperation, the United States demanded South 
Korea to increase its contribution, forcing South 
Korea to accept a Special Measure Agreement 
that increased its contribution by 8%, from 
800 million dollars to 924 million dollars in 
the beginning of 2019 (Manyin et al., 2019). 
Trump insisted that US allies should pay for the 
security guarantee (Bisley, 2020). He pushed 
South Korea to increase its contribution of up 
to 4.7 billion dollars for the next year, including 
several new post burdens, such as military 
equipment, operational, and training costs for 
American troops outside South Korea related 
to securing the Korean Peninsula (S. A. Snyder, 
2019). South Korea’s objection to this request 
then raised the discourse in the US government 
about reducing American troops and accused 
the former as a free rider (S. A. Snyder, 2019). 
Furthermore, the United States also moved its 
military camp to the south away from the South 
Korean border with North Korea, with a 94% 
cost percentage borne by South Korea (Manyin, 
Chanlett-Avery, & Williams, 2021).
These uncertain relations were then 
exacerbated by inconsistency—not to say 
declining—of the US commitment toward the 
security affairs in North-East Asia. Compared 
to Obama, the Trump administration had so far 
been more explicit in seeing China as a long-
term geopolitical rival as well as concern about 
North Korean nuclear proliferation but has not 
yet made substantive changes to the US security 
policy to match this declaratory shift (Bisley, 
2020, p. 162). Unpredictability and wild policy 
swings had been the central feature of Trump's 
incoherent and inconsistent policies toward 
East Asia during his term as president of the 
US (Matray, 2018). This situation has given 
South Korea doubt about the US commitment 
in facing Asia’s security challenge. Therefore, 
South Korea ought to prepare for the worst 
in the middle of the US’ diminished role by 
keeping Japan close.
US Inconsistency: South Korea’s Threat 
Perception Signifiers
Uncertainty of the US commitment 
toward the security challenge in East Asia 
and unstable relations with South Korea 
increase the perception of South Korea's 
security threat. Borrowing Cha’s assumption 
(2000, p. 263), when there are high degrees of 
security dependence on the patron, the patron 
commitment level can magnify threat-induced 
pressures on alliance behavior. Although 
domestically there are both opposition and 
affirmative groups that influence the country’s 
foreign policy toward the United States 
(Darussalam, 2020), South Korea has always 
been concerned with US commitment. The 
lesson learned from the Korean War was that 
South Korea suffered significant losses shortly 
after America withdrew its troops from South 
Korea in 1949. The historical experience of 
national insecurity among the absence of 
great power allies prompted South Korea to 
immediately seek an alliance partner. This 
goal was reached when the Mutual Defense 
Treaty between South Korea and the US was 
established in 1953 (Chun, 2000). Going back 
to the current dynamics of US-South Korea 
relations and uncertainty of US commitment 
in the region, South Korea needs to reconsider 
its intention to leave GSOMIA. The current 
US security policy in Asia is stuck somewhere 
between inertia and neglect, prompting friends 
and allies to accelerate their planning for a 
region in which the United States plays a more 
diminished role (Bisley, 2020, p. 162).
Hence, assessing the US attitude in the 
above sections shows how the outer factor 
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has raised concerns among the South Korean 
security policymakers that their country needs 
reliable backup partners, inevitably increasing 
its abandonment fears toward Japan as its 
quasi-alliance. The limited choice of alternative 
alliances other than Japan (especially in the 
region) and the high risk that South Korea has 
to bear without having security support from 
the alliance are becoming obstacles to exit. As 
Cha (2000) correctly posits, this condition will 
push the two quasi-alliance states to strengthen 
their bilateral cooperation. It seems preferable 
for South Korea to compromise its current 
friction with Japan rather than bearing alone 




The years 2018 and 2019 were allegedly 
the worst phase in South Korea-Japan relations 
since the normalization of relations in 1965. 
The reemergence of the historical issue of past 
Japanese atrocities against South Korea had 
escalated to the economic aspect that hampered 
the semiconductor chip industry vital to South 
Korea's economy and its national defense. 
The deteriorating tensions prompted South 
Korea to issue an official statement in August 
2019 announcing that it would withdraw from 
GSOMIA. However, in November 2019, before 
the end of the cooperation period, South Korea 
reversed its decision to leave GSOMIA. 
 South Korea preferred to commit to 
GSOMIA even though it currently has severe 
problematic relations with Japan. This research 
shows that South Korea was experiencing 
abandonment fears toward their ally. This 
is due to several factors, including its inner 
and outer core of quasi-alliance with Japan. 
South Korea was still in a high perception of 
North Korea's threat that was exacerbated by 
the region's political dynamics and uncertain 
commitment from the United States. Leaving 
the alliance would mean that South Korea 
had to face the threats alone. Even though 
South Korea had been developing its military 
capabilities, as seen from its efforts to increase 
its military budget consistently every year, 
it has not significantly increased its internal 
balancing capability against Japan, Russia, or 
China. It is therefore not favorable for South 
Korea to stand alone to "balance" these great 
powers in the region without GSOMIA.
The lack of alternative alliances in the 
region also made South Korea admit Japan as its 
most likely partner choice. Several appeasement 
actions of Japan to North Korea in the past only 
increased South Korea’s abandonment fears. 
Concomitantly, South Korea could not rely on 
the United States due to the latter uncertain 
relations and inconsistency in the foreign and 
security policy's commitment in the Northeast 
Asia region. Again, these unfavorable conditions 
pushed South Korea to retain its partnership with 
Japan. South Korea would have had to bear too 
much of the burden and cost alone had it persisted 
in leaving the alliance. Compromising its conflict 
with Japan is thus the most likely choice to take 
in the current security dynamics. Hence, when 
facing severe abandonment fears, maintaining the 
quasi-alliance even with a dilemmatic partner(s) 
remains the best worst policy alternatives for a 
state to pursue.
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